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INTRODUCTION
For the first time in history, a permanent International Criminal
Court (hereinafter ICC) will come into force on July 1, 2002.' The
enabling statute for the ICC is the Rome Statute, a United Nations
(hereinafter U.N.) treaty originally drafted at the U.N.'s 1998 confer-
ence in Rome, Italy.2 It laid the foundation for a lasting international
tribunal dedicated to "trying individuals accused of committing
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity."3 The world's re-
action to the atrocities of World War II was the ICC's modern genesis.
Specifically, the temporary tribunals established at Nuremberg and
Tokyo for the prosecution of Nazi and Japanese war criminals paved
the way for a permanent international criminal tribunal.4 Although
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2 See Coalition for an International Criminal Court Press Room, The Rome Statute, at
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3 See Coalition of the International Criminal Court Home Page, at www.iccnow.org. (last
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4 See Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind the U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal
Court, 5 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. (1999), at http://vv.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol5/
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momentum for the ICC's creation stalled for the next four decades,5
the late 1980s saw a resurgence of effort fueled by the U.N.'s recogni-
tion that national and international atrocities did not end with World
War 11.6 Almost a decade later, the U.N.'s Preparatory Committee
would present the world with the Rome Statute.7
The 1980's revitalization of interest in the ICC mirrors the current
global disposition towards this novel body.8 By April 11, 2002, 139
countries had signed the Rome Statute in expression of support for
the tribunal's future establishment.9 Even more significantly on this
date, the Rome Statute received its sixtieth domestic ratification, the
number required for the ICC to become operative with the binding
force of international law.10 The United States under the Clinton
Administration expressed enthusiastic support for the tribunal when
it became a signatory party of the Rome Statute on December 31,
2000.11 As David Scheffer, serving as United States Ambassador at
Large for War Crime Issues, stated after the Rome conference: "[The
United States'] experience with the establishment and operation of
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda had convinced us of the merit of creating a permanent court
that could be more quickly available for investigations and prosecu-
tions and more cost efficient in its operation. 12
Approximately four years later, however, the United States' reti-
cence continues to grow for concluding the domestic ratification of
5 Scholars have cited a period of military inaction and the Cold War environment as having
diminished the enthusiasm for and practicality of the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court. See, e.g., id. See also Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against
the Proposed International Criminal Court, Cato Policy Analysis No. 311, at
http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-311.htnl (July 16, 1998) ("[The International Law Commis-
sion's] project was shelved when it became apparent that the political climate of the Cold War
made such a court impracticable.").
6 See Scharf, supra note 4, at http://wvv.nesl.edu/annual/vol5/scharf.htm (discussing in-
stances of atrocities since World War n1).
For a detailed history of the ICC and its roots in the Hague Conferences, see Leila Nadya
Sadat, The Evolution of the ICC: From Hague to Rome and Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 31 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
8 Coalition for an International Criminal Court, United States Signs International Criminal
Court Treaty, at http://-v.igc.org/icc/htl/pressrelease20001231.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2002) (quoting William R. Pace, Convenor of the Coalition for an International Criminal
Court, stating that in signing the Rome Statute, "the USA joins the overwhelming majority of
the world's nations and almost all of America's closest political, and military allies in expressing
support for the establishment of the new permanent court").
Coalition for an International Criminal Court, at http://www.igc.org/icc/ (last visited
April 23, 2002).
10 Id. http://vvv.igc.org/icc/html/pressrelease20020130.html.
n See UNA-USA, Senate to Revisit International Criminal Court: Clinton's 11th Hour Signing of
ICC Treaty Leaves Issue To Senate, at http://v.unausa.org (Jan. 4, 2001).
12 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the US. National Interest?, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (statement of David Scheffer)
[hereinafter Statement of David Scheffer].
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the Statute necessary to make its membership in the ICC binding.
The Senate's attempt to pass legislation that bars the United States'
membership in the ICC and allows the President to use "all means
necessary and appropriate" to free United States citizens and allies
from ICC detention is emblematic of the heated debate in which the
United States is now engaged over its future relationship with the in-
ternational tribunal.1
Besides doubts as to the efficacy of such a body,14 the intensity
level of the debate around the practical and constitutional implica-
tions of ICC membership continues to rise. Practically speaking,
United States concerns derive from ICC criminal cases initiated by
the complaint of a state party or by the Prosecutor of the ICC. 15 Be-
cause the United States will have little to no control over these prose-
cutions, government officials fear that the ICC will undermine the
Justice Department's efforts in international law enforcement. 16
There is also concern that foreign powers will manipulate the court
to achieve political agendas. 17 The United States sees itself particu-
larly vulnerable to this threat because, "as the world's greatest military
and economic power, more than any other country the United States
is expected to intervene to halt humanitarian catastrophes around
the world," and therefore "[its] unique position renders United
13 See Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Congress Backs Away from Passing Strong
Anti-ICC Legislation, at http://vv.igc.org/icc/html/HydeAmendment.html (last visited Janu-
ary 31, 2002) [hereinafter Congress Backs Away] (reporting that in a conference committee
meeting, Congress backed away from this legislation and instead passed the Hyde Amendment,
which prohibits Defense Department funding for ICC initiatives). See also Press Release, Coali-
tion for the International Criminal Court, American Servicemembers' Protection Act Receives Senate
Approval, at http://v.igc.org/
icc/html/pressrelease2001121 l.pdf.
14 See CNN, International War-Crimes Court Approved at http://v.cnn.com/WORLD/
europe/9807/18/crimes.trib/ (July 18, 1998) (reporting that David Scheffer felt that the ICC
was in danger of being "strong on paper and weak in reality").
15 The ICC actually provides two tracks for the initiation of criminal cases. One track allows
for the U.N. Security Council to initiate cases. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference, Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 at art. 13 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute]. Little concern exists regarding cases that arise from this track because of the
influential and permanent role the United States serves as a member of the Security Council.
See Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Re-
sponse, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 855, 883 (1999) ("As a permanent member of the Security
Council capable of vetoing any proposed decision, the United States has little reason to fear
frivolous international prosecutions. It would be both futile and irrational for the ICC to pro-
voke an indispensable patron."). The second track allows state parties, countries that have rati-
fied the Rome Statute, and the Prosecutor, the ICC's statutorily created general prosecutor, to
independently initiate investigations and prosecutions. See Rome Statute at art. 13.
16 See Scharf, supra note 4.
17 CNN, U.S. To Sign War Crimes Treaty, at http://,vw.cnn.com/2000/US/12/31/
war.tribunal/index.html (Dec. 31, 2000) (quoting Senator Chuck Hagel, R-Nebraska).
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States personnel uniquely vulnerable to the potential jurisdiction of
an international criminal court."'
The United States allayed some of these fears after winning several
procedural safeguards at the Rome conference.19 One notable pro-
tection is the Statute's integration of procedural "complimentarity."
Under this system, the ICC serves solely as a court of last resort for
cases initiated by state parties or the ICC Prosecutor and exercises ju-
risdiction only after it can be established that domestic authorities are
"unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution."2 Thus, there are significant obstacles to an ICC prose-
cution of United States citizens and officials against the will of the
United States.
Urgent constitutional concerns, however, have yet to be suffi-
ciently addressed or resolved. Accordingly, it is this Comment's goal
to explore the constitutional conflicts that would arise were the
United States to become a state party of the ICC. Part I of this Com-
ment will analyze the procedural constitutional issues arising from
the ICC's alleged failure to provide United States citizens and officials
with their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Part II will focus on
substantive constitutional concerns. Specifically, it will examine how
membership in the ICC catalyzes the relocation of constitutional
powers from the United States to the international tribunal, as well as
from the legislative and judicial branches to the executive branch of
the United States government. The Comment concludes by suggest-
ing that the impetus for these transfers of constitutional power is the
domestic acknowledgement of membership in the rising global
community, and that this evolving association will further compel
fundamental alterations of the Constitution's current paradigm.
I. Loss OF CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS?
In attacking the constitutionality of United States' membership in
the ICC, one of the major battle cries of scholars and government of-
ficials is that the ICC does not provide the procedural safeguards of
is Scharf, supra note 4, at http://vwv.nesl.edu/annual/vol5/scharf.htm.
19 Ambassador Scheffer stated that "the U.S. delegation [to the Rome conference] certainly
reduced exposure to unwarranted prosecutions by the international court through our success-
fil efforts to build into the treaty a range of safeguards that will benefit not only us but also our
friends and allies." Statement of David Scheffer, supra note 12, at 13.
29 Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 17 (1) (a) and (b). Under this system of"complimentar-
ity," the ICC only serves as a "safety net in case of the collapse of national criminal jurisdiction."
Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court; 33
COLULJ. TRANSNAT'LL. 73,99 (1995).
21 Statement of David Scheffer, supra note 12, at 12-15 (discussing safeguards for which the
United States delegation fought).
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the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights.2 Thus, they ar-
gue, United States citizens and officials would be subject to unconsti-
tutional prosecutions of crimes committed outside the United States
that fall within the ICC'sjurisdiction. 2 A House Bill proposed to pre-
vent ratification of the Rome Statute claims that "a defendant would
face a judicial process almost entirely foreign to the traditions and
standards of the United States and be denied the right to a trial by a
jury of one's peers, reasonable bail, a speedy trial, and the ability to
confront witnesses to challenge the evidence against the defendant."24
Critics have also pointed out that the Rome Statute does not provide
safeguards against double jeopardy" and follows guidelines for trials
in absentia that significantly differ from those used in the United
States.26 The fundamental assumption of these arguments is that
United States citizens and officials are entitled to invoke constitu-
tional protections in international courts sanctioned by their gov-
ernment. This proposition is bolstered by the United States Supreme
Court's declaration that: "When the Government reaches out to pun-
ish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land."
2 7
There is a wealth of practical and theoretical responses, however,
that mortally wound the centrality of these concerns in the debate
over the constitutionality of United States' membership in the ICC
community. Most notably, analysis of the ICC's procedural frame-
22 Protection of United States Troops From Foreign Prosecution Act of 1999, H.R. 2381,
106th Cong. § 2(5) (1999) [hereinafter Foreign Prosecution Act] (stating that "[b]ecause the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution would not be available to
those individuals prosecuted by the Court, the United States could not participate in, or facili-
tate, any such court"). In addition, the Rome Statute contains no reference to or restriction by
any particular country's domestic law. See Rome Statute, supra note 15.
23 For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of ICC prosecution of crimes commit-
ted within the United States, see discussion infra Part II.A.3.
24 See Foreign Prosecution Act, § 2(3) (B). The Bill further claims that the ICC would prose-
cute United States citizens and officials "without the benefit of a trial by jury, in a tribunal that
would not guarantee many other rights granted by the United States Constitution and laws of
the United States, and where the judges may well cherish animosities, or prejudices against
them." Id. § 2(6) (A).
25 See Lara A. Ballard, The Recognition and Enforcement of International Criminal CourtJudgents
in U.S. Courts, 29 COLUtvL HUM. RT5. L. REV. 143, 178 (1997); Dempsey, supra note 5, at
http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-31 1.html.
26 For a detailed discussion on the differing treatment of trials in absentia by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure Rule 43 and ICC Draft Statute article 37, see Daniel J. Brown, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and Trial in Absentia, 24 BROOKJ. INT'LL. 763 (1999).
27 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (holding that respondents did not lose their civilian
status by living abroad and as members of a United States soldier's family, and that the courts of
the United States alone had the power to try the respondents for their offenses against the
United States).
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work, evaluation of the international tribunal's exemption from the
requirements of Article III courts, and examination of the constitu-
tionality of extradition treaties elucidates that constitutional concerns
regarding the ICC's procedural framework are readily allayed.
A. The Procedural Safeguards of the ICC
The ICC is not devoid of fundamental principles of justice. On
the contrary, the international tribunal conforms to many of the due
process ideals espoused by the United States. In fact, it provides for a
set of "minimum guarantees" which closely mirror many of the cher-
ished protections afforded by the Constitution.28 For example, the
Rome Statute implements the presumption of innocence, a habeas
corpus standard and ex post facto protections.2 Additionally, the
Statute provides for the adoption of a set of rules for procedure and
evidence that will further ensure conformity with the United States'
conceptions of fundamental constitutional due process.30
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized constitutionally permissible restrictions of procedural protec-
tions. For example, the Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14 of the United States Constitution "creates an exception to
the normal method of trial in civilian courts as provided by the Con-
stitution and permits Congress to authorize military trials of members
of the armed services without all the safeguards given an accused by
Article III and the Bill of Rights." 3' Moreover, the high Court in Palko
v. Connecticut stated that rights such as trial by jury and immunity
from prosecution except as the result of an indictment, while both
rights of relative import, "are not of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty, 32 and that to discard them would not "violate a
'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."'3 Therefore, as long as the
ICC is deemed to possess all procedural protections and rights con-
Rome Statute, supra note 15, art. 67(1).
Id art. 24(1)-(2).
Brown, supra note 15, at 862. The ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence are being de-
veloped with the input of United States delegates and are believed to be consistent with United
States notions of proper procedural protections. Additionally, a section will be added entitled
"Elements of Crimes." This "will elaborate upon the detailed definitions of crimes already con-
tained in the Statute." Id. at 865.
31 Reid, 354 U.S. at 19.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
33 Id (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)) (noting that "[f]ew would be so
narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system ofjustice would be im-
possible without [such due process rights as trial byjury and immunity from prosecution except
as the result of an indictment]").
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sidered "fundamental," the tribunal's prosecutions would not offend
constitutional due process standards.
B. The ICC Is Not an Article III Court
The ICC's status as a court of foreign jurisdiction (as opposed to a
court established under Article III of the United States Constitution),
however, obviates the requirement that the international tribunal's
procedural safeguards mirror those of the Constitution.3 Non-Article
III courts, such as courts of foreign jurisdiction, are in no way bound
to provide the full constitutional guarantees that are constitutionally_
mandated for United States citizens in Article III court proceedings.
The Supreme Court has definitively stated that United States citizens
and officials are not constitutionally entitled to invoke constitutional
protections when being prosecuted by a foreign court for a crime
that occurred outside the jurisdiction of the United States.M
Several factors clearly evince that the ICC is not an Article III
court, but is rather an "organ of the United Nations or an associated
independent international organization." 37 Most fundamentally, the
ICC was not established pursuant to Article III.3 Congress did not
create the ICC and plays no role in determining the duration of serv-
ice and compensation of the ICC's judges.39 Additionally, the Presi-
dent of the United States does not nominate the judges. Moreover,
the ICC is deliberately structured to operate independently of the in-
fluences of any one nation by deriving its authority from the interna-
tional community generally. Therefore, the ICC is in no way ac-
countable to Article III or the Constitution.
It is likely that the ICC would not come under the purview of Arti-
cle III even if the United States were deemed to have played a signifi-
See Brown, supra note 26, at 789.
See Ilia B. Levitine, Constitutional Aspects of an International Criminal Court, 9 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL 27,43 (1996).
36 See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) (proclaiming that the rights guaranteed un-
der the Constitution to persons charged with committing a crime within the United States "have
no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of
a foreign country").
37 See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 105.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (requiring that "the judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. TheJudges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall... receive ... a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office").
39 Id.
40 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41 See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 105 (claiming that "[tihe international court operates
under its own authority and applies its own law, the judicial power it exercises is that of the in-
ternational community rather than that of any one state").
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cant role in the creation of the court or in the investigation and de-
tention of ICC suspects.42 This argument is based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Hirota v. MacArthur.43 In Hirota the Court ruled
that although the United States, through the actions of General
Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander, created an In-
ternational Military Tribunal for Far East war crimes, the interna-
tional court was "not a tribunal of the United States," and thus "the
courts of the United States [had] no power or authority to review, to
affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences." It is sig-
nificant to note that the United States exercised a substantially
greater amount of direct control and influence in establishing the
tribunal in Hirota than in establishing the Rome Statute's ICC.4 Even
so, "the fact that the United States participates in an international
body with judiciary functions no more renders that body's actions
'the judicial Power of the United States' under Article III than the
Security Council's actions are an exercise of United States 'legislative
Powers' under Article I. '
C. Exercise of ICCJurisdiction Is Functionally Equivalent
to the Exercise of an Extradition Treaty
A rebuke of the above Article III argument stemming from a con-
struction of an early draft of the Rome Statute declares that, with re-
gard to "complimentarity," the ICC is a "projection of national
courts," and must therefore provide United States citizens with con-
stitutional protections.47 To the contrary, there is little practical dif-
ference between the exercise of ICC complimentarity and the consti-
tutional process of extradition.48 Therefore, and to the extent of
their functional equivalence, the exercise of ICC jurisdiction should
enjoy the same constitutional endorsement as extradition treaties.
42 See id.
338 U.S. 197 (1948).
44 Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198.
45 SeeMarquardt, supra note 20, at 107.
461 at 105-06 (citing LOUIS HENMIN, ARMS CONrROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW 126
(1958)).
47 Brown, supra note 26, at 790 (citing Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About an International
Ciminal Cour 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 103, 109 (1994) and Report of the Preparatory Committee
on International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 5 U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996), Preamble pt. 111(11)).
48 SeeBrown, supra note 26, at 790; Marquardt, supra note 20, at 108-10. Marquardt explains
that the ICC's complimentary system fits within the United States' current extradition scheme.
He further notes that "[e]xtradition hearings are more like probable cause hearings than adju-
dications of guilt or innocence and need not be carried out before an Article Iijudge." Mar-
quardt, supra note 20, at 108.
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The Supreme Court stated that "there is no occasion for stipulat-
ing that extradition shall fail merely because the fugitive may succeed
in finding, in the country of refuge, some state, territory or district in
which the offense charged is not punishable."49 In other words, "the
United States may surrender a fugitive to be prosecuted for acts
which are not crimes within the United States." As Justice Harlan
proclaimed in Neely v. Henkel: "When an American citizen commits a
crime in a foreign country he cannot complain if required to submit
to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe for its own people .... , Justice Harlan's view
is embodied in the United States judiciary's rule of "non-inquiry."
This rule provides that, in determining United States obligations and
compliance with a treaty governing an extradition hearing, a United
States court must presume the foreign trial will be fair, and the court
is not "permitted to inquire into the procedure which awaits [a de-
fendant] upon his return .... Such matters, so far as they may be
pertinent, are left to the State Department."52
Although Supreme Court precedent appears to weigh heavily in
favor of "non-inquiry," questions still linger as to the boundaries of
this doctrine.53 In Gallina v. Fraser, the Court explained that the
outer-limits of "non-inquiry" existed where extradition may place
United States citizens at the mercy of "procedures or punishment so
antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reex-
amination of the principle [of non-inquiry]. ' 54 As the above makes
clear, the ICC's procedural framework could hardly be characterized
as "antipathetic" to constitutional due process. Thus, in so far as it
operates as an extradition treaty, the exercise of ICC jurisdiction is
constitutionally permissible.
D. Little To Fear from the ICC's Procedural Constitutionality
Some scholars argue that a recent Supreme Court case provides a
novel justification for the belief that the ICC's procedural structure
must precisely comport with the Constitution's due process guaran-
tees for the United States' membership to be constitutional. In
4 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 300 (1933).
50 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276 (1933)).
51 Neelyv. Henkle, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
52 Garcia-Guillem v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Gallina, 278
F.2d at 78).
See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 119-26.
54 Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79; see also Marquardt, supra note 20, at 110 (discussing the "theoreti-
cal possibility" of an exception to the principles of non-inquiry).
55 See generally Scott W. Andreasen, Note, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution
Preclude Its Ratification by the United States, 85 IOWAL. REV. 697 (2000).
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United States v. Balsys, the Court noted a situation where a United
States citizen may be entitled to invoke Bill of Rights protections in a
prosecution involving a court of foreign jurisdiction.w The Court hy-
pothesized:
If it could be said that the United States and its allies had enacted sub-
stantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses of interna-
tional character, and if it could be shown that the United States was
granting immunity from domestic prosecution for the purpose of obtain-
ing evidence to be delivered to other nations as prosecutors of a crime
common to both countries, then an argument could be made that the
Fifth Amendment should apply based on fear of foreign prosecution
simply because that prosecution was not fairly characterized as distinctly
"foreign." The point would be that the prosecution was as much on be-
half of the United States as of the prosecuting nation, so that the division
of labor between evidence gatherer and prosecutor made one nation the
agent of the other, rending fear of foreign prosecution tantamount to
fear of a criminal case brought by the Government itself.
57
A closer reading of this case, however, uncovers that this hypotheti-
cal's relevance to the ICC is questionable at best. First, it must be
noted that the Court recognized this argument as mere speculation,
and failed to reach the merits of its validity." Second, although some
analogies may appropriately be drawn between this hypothetical and
the United States' relationship with the ICC, there are significant dif-
ferences between the two that greatly diminish the value of their jux-
taposition. Notably, the Court used the above hypothetical specifi-
cally to demonstrate that a defendant should be entitled to invoke
the Self-Incrimination Clause where the United States government
inaccurately or misleadingly characterizes a prosecution as "distinctly"
foreign." Such a conclusion does not directly address, however,
whether a foreign body, acting on authority independent of the
United States (as the ICC will), may prosecute United States citizens
and officials without the full guarantees of the Constitution.
6
0
Moreover, the hypothetical simply involves the United Sates opting
for an analogous foreign prosecution of an international offense,
whereas the ICC requires a formal agreement (the Rome Statute) to
instruct the jurisdictional change. This difference further depreci-
ates the relevance of the above hypothetical for two reasons. The first
is that ICC membership necessitates the domestic ratification of a
treaty that clearly delineates the origins of an ICC prosecution,
whereas the absence of a treaty in the hypothetical above obfuscates
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 698-99 (1998).
58 See id.
0 See id. at 699.
60 See id. at 699-700.
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whether the foreign jurisdiction would be exercised on behalf of the
United States. The second is that, in addressing the constitutionality
of the United States opting out of a prosecution for which it has ju-
risdiction, the Supreme Court has consistently declared that the
United States government is not constitutionally mandated to exer-
cise its jurisdiction in every instance that it is constitutionally
granted. In fact, some scholars argue that the United States gov-
ernment has constitutional flexibility in deciding whether to act upon
its constitutionally granted jurisdiction over crimes committed on
United States soil. 2
Regardless of the lack of instructiveness this case provides for de-
termining the constitutionality of United States' membership in the
ICC, there is no denying that the ICC will not provide all the protec-
tions afforded United States citizens and officials by the Constitution.
The ICC does, however, possess many of the United States' cherished
due process guarantees, and it can reasonably be argued that the pro-
tections the ICC fails to provide are not so fundamental as to make
the United States' membership in the tribunal unconstitutional. Ad-
ditionally, as a court of foreign jurisdiction, the Constitution does not
require that the ICC provide the procedural protections mandated
for all Article III courts. Finally, extradition precedent clearly indi-
cates that similar exercises of ICC jurisdiction pass constitutional
muster.
II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL POWER TRANSFERS
Part I focused on whether United States' membership in the ICC
was constitutionally permissible in light of the international tribunal's
deviation from the Constitution's procedural framework. The force
and persuasiveness of those decrying the ICC's constitutionality in
this regard are greatly diminished by appeal to the procedural pro-
tections the ICC provides, to the ICC's exemption from the proce-
dural requirements of Article III as a court of foreign jurisdiction,
and to extradition precedent. The potential for constitutional crises
remains unmitigated, however, in the realm of the substantive con-
flicts created by United States' membership in the ICC community.6
61 SeeJohn Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objec-
tions to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85, 108 (2000); Marquardt, supra note 20, at 73 (citing
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957)).
See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 73 (citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957)); see also
supra Part II.A.3.
Professor Brian F. Havel, in speaking about the United States' relationship with suprana-
tional organizations generally, notes that "[t]he germane constitutional inquiry, however, is not
whether supranational institutions can bind states and enforce obligations-the old preoccupa-
tion with 'bindingness' of international law-but whether it is constitutionally permissible in the
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As the following analysis demonstrates, the constitutional volatility
stems from the ICC's compulsion of fundamental alterations to the
structure and functioning of the United States government. Specifi-
cally, a binding membership in the ICC necessitates two significant
forms of transfers of constitutionally created powers that reside
within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches according to
the Founders' scheme. The first manifests as a transfer of constitu-
tional power from the United States government as a whole to the in-
ternational authority vested within the ICC. This Comment will refer
to this first type of transfer as an "external transfer." The second
form of power transfer, the "internal transfer," relocates constitution-
ally granted powers among the three branches. This Part examines
these transfers, and elaborates on the unconstitutional alterations of
the United States government they catalyze.
A. External Transfers of Constitutional Power
External transfers threaten the Founders' scheme by delegating
United States constitutional power to foreign entities capable of ex-
ercising that power unrestrained by constitutional shackles. These
exercises result in the unconstitutional alteration of the United States
government's structure and the diminishment of United States sover-
eignty. United States' membership in the ICC would engender ex-
ternal transfers of precedent genesis traditionally entrenched in do-
mestic courts, of treaty conclusion powers, and of the United States
government's jurisdiction over its own citizens and officials. The suc-
ceeding sections of Part II.A will analyze these three transfers and
their constitutional ramifications.
1. Usurpation and Replacement of Precedent Genesis
Once bound to the ICC as a state party, the United States would
be subject to an external transfer that shifts the generation of legal
precedents and norms from federal and state tribunals to the interna-
tional tribunal. A similar process of molding foreign law into domes-
tic jurisprudence has actually been a staple of the United States judi-
ciary since the country's inception. As Justice Gray stated:
"International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
first place for the state to bind itself and to accept the consequences of self-limitation." Brian F.
Havel, The Constitution in an Era of SupranationalAdjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 282 (2000).
64 See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tjhis court
has long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable cir-
cumstances... .").
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often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination."65
This Comment does not call into question the constitutionality of
such "precedent borrowing." It is a voluntary practice of the United
States judiciary to seek guidance from foreign jurisdictions and to in-
tegrate those principles deemed to conform to the Constitution. The
ICC, however, alters this practice by forcing the adoption of interna-
tional law in two constitutionally suspect ways. The first is that the
sheer novelty of the ICC crimes obligates United States courts to in-
tegrate ICC precedent in the establishment of any meaningful and
valid domestic jurisprudence for these crimes. The second is that the
United States judiciary will be compelled to follow ICC precedent to
protect United States citizens and officials from ICC claims initiated
by the ICC Prosecutor or by other state parties.6
a. Involuntary Adoption of Foreign Precedent To Establish Valid
Jurisprudence for ICC Crimes
The ICC was created to adjudicate crimes entirely novel in global
and national jurisprudence.67 In fact, even preliminary understand-
ings of these crimes have yet to be codified.68 It is clear, however, that
the ICC itself will ultimately sculpt and fix the definitions of these
crimes.6 If United States' membership as a state party is to have any
meaning, and if United States domestic adjudication of these crimes
for extradition purposes or otherwise is to be considered valid by the
ICC, United States courts have no choice but to conform to ICC
precedent. As with any treaty or international institution, a base level
of consistency of operation among the constituent parties is necessary
for overall efficacy. In addition, independent development of juris-
prudence for these crimes would be extremely difficult if not impos-
sible as their uniqueness leaves United States courts with no substan-
tial recourse to any existing domestic precedent. The Supreme Court
has stated that, in the absence of guidance from domestic law, "resort
must be had to the customs and usages of [other] civilized na-
tions .... .70
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
See discussion supra note 15.
67 See Brown, supra note 15, at 862; see also Rome Statute, supra note 15. Such crimes include
"genocide," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." See Congress Backs Away, supra note 13,
at http://wvv.igc.org/icc/html/HydeAmendment.html.
See Brown, supra note 15, at 862.
69 See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 112.
70 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added).
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b. Conformance with Foreign Precedent To Protect United States Citizens
and Officials
The second alteration to the practice of 'precedent borrowing"
results from the threats of "complimentarity." As stated above, the
ICC may prosecute citizens or officials of a state party, even where
that state party held or purposively refused a trial, if the ICC Prosecu-
tor or another state party establishes that the accused's government
was unable or unwilling to conduct the prosecution in accord with
ICC standards.2 Thus, in order to protect its citizens and officials
from unwelcome sequestration by the international tribunal, domes-
tic courts will be forced to follow precedent and trial procedures that
comport with these standards. 73 As a result, the ICC will "become an
unavoidable participant in the national legal process."74 The ICC's
functional equivalence to extradition treaties makes the threat more
lucid. Namely, extradition proceedings typically involve a probable
cause investigation. 3 Therefore, to minimize the viability of a claim
brought by the ICC Prosecutor or another state party against the le-
gitimacy of a United States proceeding or refusal to hold a proceed-
ing, a United States court would have to follow the ICC's definition of
a "proper" probable cause investigation.
c. The Price of Conformity
The external transfer of precedent genesis, as seen in the two it-
erations above, poses three significant threats to the United States'
constitutional paradigm. First, the transfer pressures the domestic
judiciary to put ICC membership concerns over constitutional con-
cerns. Where the basis of foreign precedent adoption is the mainte-
nance of consistency with the ICC community rather than constitu-
tional conformity, the potential exists for the integration of
unconstitutional foreign laws in domestic precedent. The second
and third threats, addressed in Part II.A.4 below, are the unconstitu-
tional amendments of the government structure and the diminish-
ment of sovereignty that result from the aggregate effect of all of the
external transfers discussed in this Part.
71 See Ballard, supra note 25, at 178-80.
7 See Rome Statute, supra note 15.
3See Dempsey, supra note 5, http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-311.html.
74Id.
See Marquardt, supra note 20, at 108-09.
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2. Delegation of the Treaty Power
ICCjudgments have implications that extend beyond the scope of
the original treaty. The fact that ICC case law can significantly alter
or supplant domestic precedent and jurisprudence is a prime exam-
ple. State parties, bound by their membership to abide by the inter-
national tribunal's decisions, must also acquiesce to the conse-
quences of ICC decisions, even those not contemplated by the
original statute. Maintaining state party status in the face of this
eventuality is functionally equivalent to allowing the international tri-
bunal to unilaterally conclude new treaties.
It has been argued that, "[t] o permit a foreign body to conclude a
treaty binding upon the United States would be equivalent to delegat-
ing the power of makin4 treaties in the measure of the provisions of
the treaty in question."' One could accurately counter that, where
the United States remained a state party of its own volition, treaty
conclusion with the ICC would remain bilateral, as failure to with-
draw from membership effectively equals acceptance of the status
quo. In practice, however, the difficulty of readily comprehending
the consequences of ICC actions and sufficiently addressing them
soon after discovery seemingly opens indefinite windows of opportu-
nity for the ICC to unilaterally conclude "new treaties."
The obvious constitutional threat from unilateral treaty conclu-
sion is that unconstitutional law can be imposed upon the United
States system, and in this case, at least until the proper institutions
remedy the law or effectuate the withdrawal of the United States'
membership from the ICC community. Moreover, as with the exter-
nal transfer of precedent genesis, the transfer of treaty-making pow-
ers contributes to the unconstitutional alteration of the United States
government's structure and diminishment of United States sover-
eignty addressed in Part II.A.4 below.
3. Curtailment of United States Jurisdiction over United States
Citizens and Officials
United States membership in the ICC abrogates constitutionally
created jurisdiction over United States citizens and officials. This ex-
ternal transfer is most controversial where a United States citizen or
76 Pitman B. Potter, Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28 AM. J. INT'L
L. 456 (1934) (citing Confbrence de la Paix, Paris, 1914, Prochs-vesbauz, rapport et documents
de la Commission de la legislation Internationale du Travail, Rome 1921); see alsoJulian G. Ku,
The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 71, 95 (2000) ("[T]he rise of a new kind of international law has created pres-
sures to delegate the international agreement-making power away from political branches of
the U.S. government and toward neutral international organizations.").
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official commits an ICC crime on United States soil. 7 At the outset, it
is important to highlight the distinction between this case, and the
similar one presented in Part I. Part I explained that there is little
cause for constitutional alarm where the ICC prosecutes United
States citizens or officials for crimes committed outside the United
States' jurisdiction. The situation discussed here, however, involves
ICC crimes committed inside United States borders by a United
States citizen or official. The significance of this difference is the ex-
plicitness with which the Constitution addresses these separate situa-
tions. Where the crimes are committed outside of the United States,
the Constitution is relatively silent, thus perpetuating the exemption
from the constitutional requirements of Article III courts enjoyed by
courts of foreign jurisdiction,' as well as justifying constitutional en-
dorsement of extradition precedent.
On the other hand, the Constitution explicitly mandates that the
United States judiciary has jurisdiction over crimes committed by
United States citizens and officials on United States soil.' Some
scholars argue that the Constitution provides that "only the States and
the Federal Government have the authority to prosecute and try indi-
viduals for offenses committed in the United States, and [that] they
may do so onit in accordance with the guarantees contained in the
Bill of Rights." The question raised by such arguments is whether,
and under what circumstances it is constitutionally permissible for
the United States to transfer constitutionally mandated jurisdiction
over United States citizens and officials.
An American Bar Association Task Force warned: "For the United
States to cede jurisdiction to an international criminal court under
these circumstances would raise profound and perhaps insurmount-
able constitutional issues. .. ,,8 This is dramatically evident where
the ICC seeks to prosecute American citizens or officials against the
will of the United States government.8 The Supremacy Clause strictly
77 See Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearings on the U.N.
Int 7 Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. on Int'7 Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Casey & Rivkin Statement] (written statement of Lee A. Casey
& David B. Rivkin,Jr.).
See discussion infra Part I.B.
9 See Casey & Rivkin Statement, supra note 77; see also American Bar Association Task Force
on an International Criminal Court, Establishment of an International Criminal Court, reprinted
in 27 INT'LL. 257, 266-69 (1993) [hereinafter ABA Task Force].
8D Andreasen, supra note 55, at 726 (emphasis added) (citing Is a U.N. International Criminal
Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Int'l Criminal Court Before the Subcomm. on
Int7 Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Profes-
sor Michael P. Scharf)); see also Marquardt, supra note 20, at 114-16.
81 ABA Task Force, supra note 7.9, at 268.
This would most likely occur where the ICC Prosecutor or another state party established
before the ICC that the United States was unable or unwilling to try the citizen or official in a
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prohibits a foreign power from overriding the United States govern-
ment's constitutionally granted jurisdiction.8 When its membership
obligations force the United States to cede such jurisdiction, state
party status in the ICC cannot be maintained without displacing the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Even where the United States willingly relinquishes its jurisdiction,
however, the constitutionality of such actions remains questionable.
Although the Supreme Court has definitively proclaimed that it is
unconstitutional for non-Article III courts to act on behalf of the
United States,84 the ICC will not be an agent of the United States, but
rather will act on its own independent authority.s Therefore, the
constitutionality of this transfer turns on whether the United States
may opt out of its constitutional jurisdiction so that a foreign body
can act in its place.
Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court flatly rejected the
notion that the United States must exercise its jurisdiction wherever
granted by the Constitution.8 The constitutionality of concurrent ju-
risdiction bolsters this proposition as federal courts may, under cer-
tain circumstances, allow a state judiciary to exercise jurisdiction con-
stitutionally granted to the federal system!' The United States
judiciary's system of concurrency, however, only permits courts
bound by the Constitution to exercise constitutionally granted juris-
diction. On the other hand, the ICC operates without constitutional
constraint. A congressional bill expresses the concern that "[t]he
creation of the [ICC] would constitute the transfer of the ultimate
authority to judge the acts of United States officials away from the
people of the United States to an unelected and unaccountable in-
ternational bureaucracy."8s Combined with the external transfers ar-
ticulated above, this would result in the unconstitutional alteration of
the United States government's structure and the diminishment of
United States sovereignty discussed in Part II.A.4 below.
Another constitutional problem arises, regardless of the volun-
tariness of the cession ofjurisdiction, when United States officials be-
manner that sufficiently comports to ICC standards. See infra note 20; see also discussion infra
Part II.A.l.b.
83 See U.S. CONS. art. VI, cl. 2; see also discussion infra Part II.A.4.
See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 56 (1866) (holding that a military court
.could exercise no part of the judicial power of the country"); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1957) (rejecting the notion that the U.S. could act on its citizens abroad without providing the
protections of the Bill of Rights).
85See supra note 41.
See supra note 61.
87 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478-80 (1981) (holding federal
courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OSCLA)).
Foreign Prosecution Act, supra note 22, § 2(2) (C).
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gin to factor in their accountability to the international tribunal when
making and executing decisions in their official capacity. This clearly
violates the fundamental precept that the United States government
must only concern itself with the dictates of its citizens and the Con-
stitution.
4. Unconstitutional Alteration of Government Structure
and Diminishment of Sovereignty
The Sections above demonstrate that ICC membership is a har-
binger of external transfers of constitutional powers. Individually,
these transfers were shown capable of introducing alien interests,
pressures, and concerns into the domestic governmental structure,
forcing the integration of potentially unconstitutional law with do-
mestic jurisprudence and infusing foreign entities with constitutional
powers. The aggregate effect of these transfers creates two additional
constitutional crises. The first is the alteration of the United States
government's structure. The second is the diminishment of United
States sovereignty.
a. Unconstitutional Amendment
Where forces and interests originating outside of the United
States body politic hold sway in government decisions, and where
foreign entities operate constitutional tools of government, the
founding structure of the United States government would undenia-
bly be altered.90 Allowing the ICC treaty to effectuate such amend-
ments to the Founders' scheme "give [s] the treaty almost the status of
a distinct branch of government-a collaboration of the executive
and legislative branches that also requires the consent of a foreign
nation. To that extent, the Framers did not define the substantive
scope of constitutional treaty-making .... ",91
The Framers did proclaim, however, that the treaty power must
not be perceived as "boundless," for if it were, "we [would] have no
Constitution."9 The Supreme Court has also stringently declared
that treaties must be subordinate to the Constitution. 3 In The Chero-
kee Tobacco, the Court proclaimed that "a treaty cannot change the
89 Reid, 354 U.S. at 6-7; Ku, supra note 76, at 122-23.
90 See Ballard, supra note 25, at 181-82 (examining the impact of an ICC treaty on United
States double jeopardy law).
91 Havel, supra note 63, at 332-33.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803) at http://odur.
Iet.rug.nl/-usa/P/j3/wviings/brf/efll60.htm (last visited March 23, 2002).
93 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-18.
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Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."94
The Reid Court held that "[i] t would be manifestly contrary to the ob-
jectives of those who created the Constitution... to exercise power
under an international agreement without observing constitutional
prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit amendment
of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V."95
b. Erosion of Sovereignty
This metamorphosis of the government is also unconstitutional
for perpetuating forces that threaten the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion domestically, and thus threatens the sovereignty of the United
States. These threats specifically emanate from allowing an entity to
exercise constitutional power free of the Constitution's constraints-
the "ideal of political accountability that animates much of the Consti-
tution's structural design. ' 96
The Supreme Court explains that "l[t] he United States is entirely a
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source." 7 The Constitution makes no explicit reference to external
transfers, and it is likely that the Founding Fathers did not consider
multilateral treaties.9 The Supreme Court has held, however, that
"no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Con-
gress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution."9 Logically, then, the Supreme Court's
prohibition on the United States government's unrestrained use of
constitutional power applies just as rigorously, if not more so, to for-
eign entities as they are even further removed from the influences of
the Constitution and the dictates of United States citizens.
Allowing unmitigated use of constitutional power threatens sover-
eignty by creating "authority outside of (and arguably superior to)
the United States Constitution; and inhibit[ing] the full autonomy of
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870).
Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. See also U.S. CONST. art. V, stating, in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
Ku, supra note 76, at 77.
9 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
See id. at 95.
9 Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
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all three branches of the United States government. . ."'00 As noted
above, such power could be used to override judgments of the United
States judiciary, conclude new treaties or unduly influence the deci-
sionmaking of United States officials.
Moreover, for membership in the international tribunal to be
binding, at least a minimal amount of the state parties' power must
be subordinated to that of the tribunals. 1 1 Although "the rules for-
mally bind individuals, they in fact bind states as well, since a state
cannot act except through the individuals who compose it." 1°2 Ar-
guably, the ICC can only be completely effective via the diminish-
ment of its state parties' sovereignty.1°
B. Internal Transfers of Constitutional Power
Use of the treaty power to create binding memberships in the ICC
and other international organizations generates internal transfers
that shift power from the legislative and judicial branches to the ex-
ecutive branch. This aggrandizement of executive power offsets the
Founders' checks and balances and allows for the circumvention of
domestic constitutional constraints. Part II.B examines the executive
branch's (specifically the President's) use of the treaty power to en-
snare the powers of the other branches and the resultant constitu-
tional crises.
1. Globalization Increases the Domestic Power of the Executive Branch
The trend towards globalization intensifies the domestic impact of
both international relations and binding international agreements.
As discussed above, treaties implementing membership in interna-
tional organizations do more than simply set standards for interac-
tion at the international level. Rather, they also have the potential to
100 Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearings on the U.N. Inter-
national Criminal Court Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John R. Bolton, Senior Vice President,
American Institute) [hereinafter Bolton statement].
101 See Ku, supra note 76, at 86; Havel, supra note 63, at 257; Marquardt, supra note 20, at 142-
43; Dempsey, supra note 5, at http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-311.html.
102 Marquardt, supra note 20, at 143.
103 See Bolton statement, supra note 100. Some completely reject that international bodies
such as the ICC necessitate unconstitutional state sovereignty diminishment. See generally LOUIS
HE4N, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990). Henkin argues that
the belief in the inevitability of unconstitutional sovereignty diminishment from membership in
international organizations derives from employing a too narrow and formalistic interpretation
of constitutional sovereignty. Instead, he suggests the appropriate interpretive paradigm is one
of flexibility and functionality that facilitates United States interaction with emerging interna-
tional institutions. See also Patricia A. McKeon, Balancing the Principles of Sovereignty Against the
DemandsforInternationalJustice, 12 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMENT. 535, 542-43 (1997).
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catalyze substantive domestic governmental change in ways likely not
envisioned by the Founding Fathers.' 1 The President, as the nation's
principal wielder of the treaty-making power, is therefore uniquely
positioned5 to harness this power in equally unimagined ways.'
Consequently, as globalization forces increase, so too will the Presi-
dent's domestic power.
A prime example is the President's utilization of self-executing
treaties.'°7 These international agreements allow the President to cir-
cumvent Senate approval in concluding treaties with binding force of
law. a38 Even where the President seeks the Senate's consent, the
forces of globalization may aid him in forcing congressional acquies-
cence. Global and domestic pressure can make the Senate "reluc-
tan[t] to defy and confront the President (especially after he can no
longer retreat), [and] ... [unwilling] to make the United States sys-
tem appear undependable, even ludicrous." 9 Once ratified, the
"constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land," and "is to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provi-
sion."1'
The President's newfound legislative power and his ability to lev-
erage Congress are also bolstered by "fast-track" ratification."' The
President can use this power to alter a treaty's substantive make-up in
order to expedite its conclusion. Although a congressionally dele-
104 See Ku, supra note 76, at 95.
105 The primacy of the President's role in international relations is well established. See, for
example, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1936), which pro-
claimed that, in foreign affairs, "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a repre-
sentative of the nation," and that, in the President's negotiations with the international com-
munity, "the Senate cannot intrude[] and Congress itself is powerless to invade .... "
106 See ARTHUR M. SCH.ESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 2 (1973) (noting that "[the
Constitution] was often cryptic, ambiguous and incomplete" regarding foreign affairs in the
Founders' system of checks and balances).
10 See George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional Integra-
tion, 46 AM.J. COMP. L. 463, 474 (Supp. 1998). An early example of congressional delegation of
the self-executing treaty power is the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. See id. at 473. The Act "ex-
pressly authorized the President to participate in the negotiations comprising the Kennedy
Round of GATT, to 'accept' an agreement on tariff reduction, and to 'proclaim' that agree-
ment so as to make it part of domestic U.S. law." Id. The Constitution mandates that the Presi-
dent receive a two-thirds vote from the Senate for treaty ratification. See U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (noting that "when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must exe-
cute the contract before it can become a rule for the court [sic]"); see also Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
108 See Bermann, supra note 107, at 473.
109 LOUIS HENIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSnT1UTION 205 (2nd ed. 1996).
"10 Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.




gated power, it allows significant circumvention of the normal con-
gressional checks. This probably explains why "Congress has shown
itself to be less than enthusiastic about continuing the practice of
granting 'fast-track' negotiating authority to the President." 4  Not-
withstanding, the Supreme Court has mandated that Congress "ac-
cord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved."" 5
An "executive agreement" is another relatively new instrument
that facilitates the internal transfer of constitutional power to the ex-
ecutive branch.16 Executive agreements encompass a broad range of
international treaties that are concluded by the President without
Senate approval." 7 The significance of these agreements ranges from
statements of policy to creation of contractual obligations with for-
eign nations or international bodies." 8 Although the limitations on
the President's freedom to conclude executive agreements "are still
not authoritatively defined,"" 9 it is generally accepted that he may use
them in fulfillment of his duties as Commander-in-Chief.1 ° In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of executive
agreements, including those without Senate consent, proclaiming
that they en*oy the "same supremacy over state law and policy enjoyed
by treaties.
2. Constitutional Implications of Executive Aggrandizement
As international relations begin to impose greater influence do-
mestically through treaties such as the Rome Statute, the Executive's
role in domestic governmental functioning will also be more influen-
tial. A quick tour of recent history reveals that Congress and the Su-
preme Court have taken turns attempting to restrain the Executive's
recent rise in power.1'2 Both branches have been frustrated by past
ns See id.
114 Id. at 475.
n5 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
11 See Bermann, supra note 107, at 464.
17 See 14 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1982).
ns For example, in United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court upheld the Litvinov agreement,
an executive agreement committing the United States to the recognition of the Soviet govern-
ment in exchange for the assignment of Russian assets. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942).
119 Id.; see also Bermann, supra note 107, at 464.
12 See Berman, supra note 107, at 464.
121 Id. at 465 (citing Pink, 315 U.S. at 229); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 331 (1934); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 306, 316 (1936); State
of Russia v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1934).
12 See Elliot L. Richardson, Distribution of Constitutional Authority: Checks and Balances in For-
eign Relations, 83 AM.J. r'L L. 736, 738 (1989).
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presidents "unilaterally committ[ing] [the United States] to a series
of controversial policies, including the Berlin airlift, the Korean War,
the Congo rescue operation, the Bay of Pigs invasion, intervention in
the Dominican Republic, and engagement in the Cuban missile cri-
sis-seeking legislative approval after the fact, if at all.''12 Executive
aggrandizement creates two fundamental constitutional crises. The
first is the unbalancing of the three governmental branches' constitu-
tional powers. The second is the circumvention of domestic constitu-
tional constraints.
a. Unbalance of Powers
"The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external rela-
tions, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' 24 With exclu-
sive control over foreign relations powers whose domestic impact in-
creases with the rise of the global community, the President will be
increasingly capable of exercising constitutional powers originally
and exclusively delegated by the Constitution to the other
branches.125 Part II.A and B elucidate the treaty-power's ability to
harness both legislative and judicial constitutional powers. Specifi-
cally, treaty conclusion has the binding force of law and is capable of
altering domestic legal precedent and jurisprudence and transferring
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explicitly declared this unconstitu-
tional when it proclaimed that "the basic separation of powers struc-
ture, which seeks to keep powers divided among different branches,
is undermined when one branch begins collecting all these constitu-
tionally-assigned powers for itself."126 The Court also held that "Con-
gress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an
unfettered discretion to make whatever laws as he thinks may be
needed or advisable ... ,27 Therefore, even overt and voluntary in-
ternal transfers, such as congressional delegation of the "fast-track"
power, may be unconstitutional.
These Supreme Court holdings embody the Founders' justifica-
tions for a rigid system of checks and balances. For, "[i]n the Ameri-
can constitutional order, the constant democratic value of each citi-
zen's vote derives not primarily from the act of voting itself, but from
the constitutional guarantee that the elected political bodies must
compete with one another for power and influence in a system of di-
123 Id.
124 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (citing John Marshall in Annuals, 6th Cong.,
col. 613).
i See SCHLESINGER, supra note 106, at 2.
126 Ku, supra note 76, at 90 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976)).
17 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935).
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vided government "'2 The Founding Fathers saw the balance of pow-
ers as critical to preventing any one faction's political dominance,
129
and to restraining the government from exercising its will against the
people's will.ls ° In the Federalist Papers, James Madison made clear• . 131
that, without the proper balance, tyranny is possible.
b. Circumvention of Domestic Constitutional Constraints
Internal transfers allow the federal government to accomplish
through treaties what it could not constitutionally legislate domesti-
cally.1 For example, in Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held
that, although the federal government had no constitutional basis for
passing domestic legislation to protect the migration of certain birds,
it was constitutionally viable for the federal government to pass the
same legislation via the treaty power in entering an international
agreement.133 This circumvention undermines the Supreme Court's
declaration that "[t]he prohibitions of the Constitution were de-
signed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they
cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Sen-
ate combined."134 The NAFTA treaty may elucidate the inherent dan-
gers of such nullification. NAFTA, it is argued, has diminished state
sovereignty beyond what would be constitutionally permissible with-
out the treaty power.&5 Specifically, the NAFTA treaty enables the
federal government to interfere with state regulation of intrastate
commerce, an invasion prohibited by the Constitution.1 3
CONCLUSION
ICC membership engenders internal and external transfers of
constitutionally created power that catalyze significant alteration of
the United States government's power balances, and thus, the Consti-
tution's scheme of accountability and legitimacy. External transfers
shift constitutional power to foreign bodies capable of exercising that
power free of constitutional constraints. Such transfers unconstitu-
tionally amend the government's structure and diminish United
States sovereignty. Similarly, internal transfers cause an unbalancing
12 Havel, supra note 63, at 287.
12 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
in SeeTHEFEDERAUSrNo. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
1 SeeTHEFEDERASrNO. 47 (James Madison).
132 See Bermann, supra note 107, at 466 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
13 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
4 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
13 Bermann, supra note 107, at 466-67.
13 Id.
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of the three branches' powers and permit federal circumvention of
domestic constitutional constraints, thus violating the Founders' no-
tions of ordered liberty.
It is critical to note, however, that new forms of international le-
gitimacy and accountability, vested exclusively in institutions such as
the ICG, are rapidly emerging in the global arena. International law
no longer only governs relations between states, but now also man-
dates that "individuals are accountable members of an international
community. In fact, the existence of international criminal law im-
plies that ties to the global community trump national ties .... ,,7 For
example, the laws of Nuremberg charged that an individual had a le-
gal duty to "disobey his sovereign national government if it attempts
to violate certain international legal principles."1' 8
The nations of the world are beginning to integrate cognizant of
the primacy of the global community, and the ICC is only one of the
latest manifestations of this trend. The crimes of the ICC (genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity)' 39 are considered to be
crimes of universal jurisdiction. In other words, "[t] hese crimes are
so universally condemned that those who commit them are consid-
ered hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), and any na-
tion in the world has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over such
persons without the consent of the individual's state of nationality."14°
The United States Restatement, recognizing the existence of univer-
sal jurisdiction, explains that "[a] state has jurisdiction to define and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the com-
munity of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism ....,141
Both the development of international organizations and the uni-
versal jurisdiction they embody reflect the evolving sense of global
community. One of the Constitution's founding precepts is severely
complicated, however, by United States citizens' acknowledgement of
their indivisibility from the global community. As Alexander Hamil-
ton explains, "every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the
objects committed to [the Constitution's] care, and to the complete
execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, [must be] free from
137 Marquardt, supra note 20, at 142 (emphasis added).
13 Id. (emphasis added).
13 Rome Statute, supra note 15.
140 Scharf, supra note 5, at http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol5/scharf.htm (citing IAN
BROWNIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (4th ed. 1990); Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423 (1987)).




every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense
of the people."'4 2 This begs the question of how to define "people" in
the face of globalization-can "people" realistically continue to be
limited to "We the People of the United States?"148
The short answer is "no." The Constitution was created to be a
vehicle of the "People's" will.144 If the Constitution fails to account for
United States citizens embracing their membership in the global
community, the founding document would be guilty of violating the
same conceptions of accountability and legitimacy for which the ICC
currently stands accused. Such failure would also threaten the
United States' legitimacy in the international arena. For example, it
is easy to imagine the difficulties the United States would face as a
non-state party attempting to prosecute a war criminal where the rest
of the nations of the world had uniformly joined the ICC.14 This is
not to say the United States should be pressured to join the ICC or
other international bodies, just that the United States will clearly lose
some of its ability to shape the growth of the global community if it
abstains from membership in international institutions.
It is possible, however, for the Constitution to retain legitimacy
and accountability in the face of the United States' membership in
the ICC and other international institutions. The Rome Statute does
not bar "interpretative declarations," or "understandings," that allow
the United States to maintain its constitutional integrity while ac-
counting for the concerns of the global community.146 For example,
before ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the United States Committee on Foreign Relations made the
interpretative declaration that "[ n] othing in this Covenant requires
or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as inter-
preted by the United States."147 Thus, where a treaty poses a constitu-
tional threat, the declaration provides the United States with the op-
portunity to take remedial actions without jeopardizing either its
commitment to the international agreement or its constitutional sov-
ereignty. In addition, legislative safeguards or even constitutional
amendments could further bolster coexistence between the Constitu-
tion and international organizations.1 Notwithstanding these pro-
tective measures, it is clear that the Constitution must account for the
rise in primacy of the global community. Whether the integrity of
142 THEFEDERA.SrNO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton).
14 THE DEClARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
144 THEFEDERALISTNO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton).
1 Scharf, supra note 5, at http://wwv.nesl.edu/intljoumal/vol5/scharf.htm.
1 Brown, supra note 15, at 888-89.
147 See S. REP. NO. 103-35, at 10 (1993).
143 SeeBrown, supra note 15, at 888-89.
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the founding document will withstand the adjustment is a question
only time can answer.
